

## **THE PRE-CONDITIONS, PRINCIPLES AND ATTRIBUTES OF POLITICAL AND TECHNOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN ITALY: HISTORY AND MODERNITY**

The article is devoted to analyzing the stages and peculiarities of the formation of a politically and party determined system of governance and public administration in Italy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In parallel, it is argued that the system of governance and public administration in Italy is historically determined by a technocratic component. On this basis, the parameters of pre-conditions, principles and attributes of political and technocratic governance in Italy (for which both political or party governments are inherent characteristic of parliamentary democracy and republic) were revealed. The author has proved that the technocratic component of party and politically determined public administration in Italy overcomes the ideological polarization of inter-party competition and the party component of governance, thus stabilizing and increasing the efficiency of governance in general. Thus, it has been recorded that the synthesis of political and technocratic components of public administration does not always undermine democratic character of the latter, although it affects the nature of the delegation of powers and responsibilities, but generates somewhat different (from the classical one) model of parliamentary democracy.

*Keywords: government, governance, public administration, politics, technocracy, Italy.*

## **ЗУМОВЛЕНІСТЬ, ПРИНЦИПИ ТА АТРИБУТИ ПОЛІТИЧНО-ТЕХНОКРАТИЧНОГО УРЯДУВАННЯ В ІТАЛІЇ: ІСТОРІЯ ТА СУЧАСНІСТЬ**

Проаналізовано етапи й особливості становлення політично та партійно детермінованої системи урядування й державного управління в Італії впродовж кінця XIX – початку XXI ст. Паралельно із цим, аргументовано, що система урядування й державного управління в Італії історично детермінована технократичною компонентою. На цій підставі виявлено параметри причинної зумовленості, принципів та атрибутів політично-технократичного урядування й управління в Італії, для якої як для парламентської демократії і республіки іманентно властиві політичні/партійні уряди. Доведено, що технократична складова партійно та політично детермінованого державного управління в Італії суттєво долає ідеологічну поляризацію міжпартійної конкуренції і партійної складової урядування, відтак і стабілізуючи, і збільшуючи ефективність

урядування загалом. Відтак зафіксовано, що синтезування політичного і технократичного компонентів державного управління не завжди підживляє демократичність останнього, хоча, з однієї сторони, позначається на природі делегування повноважень і відповідальності управлінням, але, з іншої сторони, генерує дещо відмінну від класичної модель парламентської демократії.

*Ключові слова:* уряд, урядування, державне управління, політика, технократія, Італія.

Italy is one of parliamentary democracies in Europe, which is permanently characterized by formation of party/political governments, and thus party and party-oriented style of governance. However, even despite the fact that in the country non-party/technocratic governments (for instance, headed by prime-ministers L. Dini and M. Monti) were rarely formed, of great significance and popularity is a political or technocratic style of governing. Nevertheless, it is not a peculiarity of just modern (especially since the early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) stage of development of the public administration and system of governance in Italy, but it has been inherent to the country for a long period of time. Thus, the task of the current research is to demonstrate causality, principles and attributes of political-technocratic governance and administration in Italy, which, being a parliamentary democracy, is immanently characterized by political/party governments. Handling of the current task may give an answer to the question how there happens compares on and combination of political and a political/technocratic styles of governance and public administration, in particular in democratic political regimes.

This range of problems has partially been described in works by such scientists as: W. Bakema<sup>1</sup>, J. Blondel<sup>2</sup>, M. Cotta and L. Verzichelli<sup>3</sup>, M. Dogan<sup>4</sup>, M. Fabri<sup>5</sup>, P. Farneti<sup>6</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> Bakema W., *The Ministerial Career*, [w:] Blondel J., Thiebault J. (eds.), *The profession of government minister in Western Europe*, Wyd. McMillan 1991, s. 70–98.

<sup>2</sup> Blondel J., *Ministers in Southern Europe. A comparative perspective*, Paper presented at the Seminario de Arrabida, 17–18 September 2001.; Blondel J., *The Ministers of Finance: a special type of Minister?*, European University Institute Working papers 1991: Series SPS, nr. 31.

<sup>3</sup> Cotta M., *Classe politica e parlamento in Italia*, Wyd. Il Mulino 1979.; Cotta M., *Elite unification and democratic consolidation in Italy: an historic overview*, [w:] Higley J., Gunther R. (eds.), *Elite and Democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 146–177.; Cotta M., *La crisi del governo di partito all'Italiana*, [w:] Cotta M., Isemia P. (eds.), *Il Gigante dai piedi di argilla*, Wyd. Il Mulino 1996, s. 11–52.; Cotta M., Mastropaolo A., Verzichelli L., *Parliamentary Elite transformations along the Discontinuous Road of Democratization: Italy 1861–1999*, [w:] Best H., Cotta M. (eds.), *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 226–269.; Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Italy: the sunset of a partyocracy*, [w:] Blondel J., Cotta M. (eds.), *Party and government. An inquiry into the relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996, s. 180–201.; Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen*, "South European Society and Politics" 2002, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 117–152.; Verzichelli L., *Italy. The difficult road towards a more effective process of ministerial selection*, [w:] Dowding K., Dumont P. (eds.), *The selection of ministers in Europe. Hiring and firing*, Wyd. Routledge 2009, s. 89–100.; Verzichelli L., *La distribuzione delle spoglie ministeriali. Proposte per l'analisi comparata, con una indagine sul caso italiano*, "Quaderni di scienza politica" 2001, vol 8, s. 51–98.; Verzichelli L., *Portfolio allocation*, [w:] Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 237–268.; Verzichelli L., Cotta M., *Technicians, technical government and non-partisan ministers: The Italian experience*, Presented at IPSA XXII Congress, Madrid, July 2012, 30 s.

<sup>4</sup> Dogan M., *How to become ministers in Italy*, [w:] Dogan M. (ed.), *Pathways to power: Selecting rulers in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Westview 1989, s. 99–129.

<sup>5</sup> Fabri M., *Governo e sovrano nell'Italia liberale*, „Rivista Trimestrale di Scienza dell'Amministrazione” 1991, vol 3, s. 103–186.

<sup>6</sup> Farneti P., *Sistema politico e società civile*, Wyd. Giappichelli 1971.; Farneti P., *Social conflict, parliamentary fragmentation and, Institutional shift and the rise of fascism*, [w:] Linz J., Stepan A. (eds.), *The Breakdown of the Democratic regimes: Europe*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 1978.

F. Marangoni<sup>7</sup>, A. Mastropaolo<sup>8</sup>, G. Pasquino<sup>9</sup> and many others. However, they do not provide a synthetic conclusion concerning the peculiarity and causality of the fact how the element of technocratic governance penetrates into the politically determined style of public administration in Italy.

Searching for the answer to the question we appeal to the point that historically Italy, and thus traditionally, is characterized by quite specific understanding of state governance and role of key actors – governments/governmental cabinets, ministers and high officials – in the state administrative process. Therefore namely historical peculiarities of establishing administrative, first of all ministerial, elite and role of political parties and interparty competitiveness played a key role in penetration of technocratic elements and corporate mind predominantly political, at least as to its nature and essence parliamentary democracy and republic, style of state governance in Italy. However, the sign if I chance of taking into account peculiarities and current parameters of the administrative status of ministers in Italy is crucial, both historically and currently, for comprehension of the governing process and system of governance, as ministers in governments/governmental cabinets, especially in the context of parliamentary democracy, are conceived as politicians who must bear political responsibility for specific administrative functions, which have been developed if the country is interpreted as a polity. The point is that ministers being agents of public administration and governance according to their institutional role are very close to the so-called “center of the game” for power and control over it. Thus, ministers, as well as the prime-minister as the highest administrative elite under parliamentary democracy occupy political space, which on the one hand, is determined by functional requirements to a certain polity, and on the other hand, by pressure they exert in the course of such political game and control over the administrative apparatus of the country. That is why competence, efficiency and specialization of ministers and other representatives of administrative elite in comparison with such political attributes of state governance as legitimization and political loyalty are rather competitive criteria, which influence the choice and assignment of different ministers, officials and functionaries to specific political and administrative posts. From this perspective attributive peculiarity of Italy is in the fact that according to the average political style of governance, which by default is inherent to this country, quite a big scope of functions within the public administration is put on ministers, who on the one hand are top-rated politicians, and on the other hand are effective technocrats and bureaucrats. That

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<sup>7</sup> Marangoni F., Technocrats in Government: The Composition and Legislative Initiatives of the Monti Government Eight Months into its Term of Office, “*Bulletin of Italian Politics*” 2012, vol 4, nr. 1, s. 135–149; Marangoni F., Verzichelli L., *Italy: from personalized polarization to technocratic co-operation?*, Presented at 2012 SISP Congress, Roma, 13–14 September 2012, 30 s.

<sup>8</sup> Mastropaolo A., Sviluppo politico e parlamento nell'Italia liberale. Un'analisi a partire dai meccanismi della rappresentanza, “*Passato e Presente*” 1986, vol 12, s. 29–93.

<sup>9</sup> Pasquino G., *Party government in Italy: achievement and prospects*, [w:] Katz R. (ed.), *Party government: European and American perspectives*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1987, s. 202–242.

is the way how politically-determined style of state governance goes hand-in-hand with the elements of technocracy, bureaucracy and corporatism<sup>10</sup>.

There as on of such phenomenon lies in the political history of Italy of the late 19<sup>th</sup>–early 21<sup>st</sup> century, in particular in the gradual change of the system of state governance and administration, as well as political regimes, which were inherent to it. Its influence on establishing modern style of state governance in this country had: changes in understanding political and bureaucracy/technocracy from the perspective of their positioning, at first in the frames of the “minimal state” concept, and later as a “state of general welfare”, change of criteria, nature and determination of “political game” phenomenon and political decisions concerning control over power while transferring from the monarch legitimacy to the restricted and then to the mass representativeness. Such transformational processes had impact on the ways of developing structure of government, governance, public administration and its staff (administrative elite), as transformation of “political game” became a significant catalyst for creation of peculiar channels of enlistment and models of career advancement in the sphere of political and administrative elite. On the other hand, transformation of functions and role of the state in accordance with the Italian society and its problems was represented in quality and quantity of ministers, who were consistently rendered throughout its historical past. As the competence of power-executive structures and administrative staff machinery grew from relatively restricted functions, connected with maintenance of domestic and foreign order in the country, to a larger array of functions, concerning development of economy and social equality and justice<sup>11</sup>. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned, that the tendency towards enlargement of powers and quantitative representativeness of administrative hierarchy in Italy had a linear character throughout the whole history and was slowed down or even suspended only in the last decades, when the country entered the phase of “turnaround”. However, even this tendency was marked by a transition of a large number of governmental and administrative powers towards powers of independent centers of power centers, as well as local administrations and supranational structures. In general it should be stated that in comparison with the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century the number of ministers grew from 10 to 25, and the number of government members rose from 10 to 85. Similar processes took place in the context of enlarging the sphere of governments’ specialization, system of governing and public administration in Italy, especially at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century when the country, as it was mentioned above, started a significant “turnaround” of the previously inherent process of diversification of public administration. Therefore, it is quite logical to argue that total influence of these changes had significant and gradual effect both on the peculiarities of ministerial/administrative elite and on the system of governance and public administration in Italy in general. However, this impact can still be felt during

<sup>10</sup> Cotta M., Verzichelli L., Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen, “*South European Society and Politics*” 2002, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 117–152.

<sup>11</sup> Ferrera M., *Il Welfare State in Italia*, Wyd. Il Mulino 1985.

some periods of political history in Italy, as the latter bear in fluence over causality, principle and attributes of technocracy penetration into politically-determined public administration in Italy. Among these periods it is necessary to single out the following: 1) the early years of parliamentary monarchy in Italy (1848–1876); 2) the years of developed parliamentary system in Italy (1876–1913); 3) the first period of mass suffrage in Italy (1913–1924); 4) the second period of mass suffrage and the stage of mass democracy in Italy after fascism (1946–1992); 5) the crisis of democracy in Italy (1992–1996); 6) the so-called “majority democracy” in Italy (since 1996 up to now)<sup>12</sup>.

The early stage of parliamentary monarchy is the period in the course of which formerly absolute monarchy in Italy was transformed into the constitutional (parliamentary) monarchy. Besides, it is the period of national unification of one of the regional states in Europe. However, the constitution and other legislation of that period were far from determining Italy as a parliamentary system and in fact did not formulate the principle of political responsibility of the government and the system of public administration before parliament, though they partially appealed to the phenomenon of parliamentary democracy. In particular, prime-ministers and governmental cabinets of that period were to enjoy support of majority in legislature<sup>13</sup>. At the same time, it was absolutely clear, that the Italian monarchy was not restricted by a symbolical role, but as it was before, it was ready and capable of playing the leading role in the process of government formation and resignation, as well as in the process of appointment ministers and their functioning and the system of governance and public administration in general. This period was characterized by an advantage of “parliamentary type of nobility” and absence of organized parties<sup>14</sup>. As a result the parliamentary life was organized in the frames competitiveness between two large political groupings: historical right – *Storica Destra* and historically left – *Sinistra Storica*<sup>15</sup>. However, neither of them was a consolidated faction, but on the contrary they were rather feebly connected in the “political sphere”, a members of the parliament formed small groups and combinations, which were often based on personal or regional grounds. Thus, from the very beginning of modern nation-building in Italy the system public administration, in particular as a result of variability of approaches towards understanding political future and administrative process, was characterized by a relative instability of governments/governmental cabinets together with relative stability of functionaries, state officials and ministers (what is testified by data, see Table I). This, in its turn, presupposed traditionally great expert experience of officials on the background of extremely instable system of the public administration in Italy.

<sup>12</sup> Cotta M., Verzichelli L., Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen, “*South European Society and Politics*” 2002, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 117–152.

<sup>13</sup> Romeo R., *Cavour e il suo tempo*, Wyd. Laterza 1984.

<sup>14</sup> Ballini P., *Le elezioni nella storia d'Italia dall'Unità al Fascismo*, Wyd. Il Mulino 1989.; Farneti P., *Sistema politico e società civile*, Wyd. Giappichelli 1971.; Cotta M., Mastropaolo A., Verzichelli L., *Parliamentary Elite transformations along the Discontinuous Road of Democratization: Italy 1861–1999*, [w:] Best H., Cotta M. (eds.), *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 226–269.

<sup>15</sup> Mack Smith D., *Modern Italy*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1997.

**Table 1.** Stability of the system of government and experience of state officials in Italy, historical perspective<sup>16</sup>

Index	1861–1876	1876–1913	1913–1922	1946–1992	1992–1996	1996–2001
Ministers' term of office, in years. <sup>16</sup>	1,9	2,1	2,0	2,7	1,6	2,3
Duration of ministerial posts, in years	2,5	3,0	2,2	3,5	1,6	2,6
Ministerial turnover, %	49,4	38,3	40,9	55,0	54,0	54,3

Źródło: Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen*, "South European Society and Politics" 2002, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 117–152.

Along with that, political basis for ministers and other officials of the period was predominantly parliamentary, though many of them worked only in the Senate. However, if we take in to account the fact that the Senate was established not on the electoral principle, but was formed upon there commendation of the monarch (being firstly proposed by the parliament), then it is easy to see that almost quarter of ministers and top officials got their posts, playing no representative-political roles (in detail, see Table 3). The social portrait of that time ministers and officials was rather clear as well. A great number of them had aristocratic background and originated from three main social categories – landlords, higher military officers and senior officials. The detailed analysis testifies, that a large number of top administrative officials among aristocrats were also great landlords. Traditional social status of aristocracy and bourgeoisie was connected with land owning and merits to the Fatherland (army and bureaucracy), and thus played the main role while appointing ministers and administrative elite in general. It means that at the dawn of formation of the system of governance in Italy existed technocratic elements of policy-making, which found their representation in the forms, involving academicians, lawyers, intellectuals as well as military officers (nevertheless, each group was characterized by specialized education) (see Table 2).

**Table 2.** Social composition of governmental cabinets and administrative staff in Italy (1848–1922)

Social groups	1848–1861, %	1861–1876, %	1876–1900, %	1900–1913, %	1900–1913, %	1913–1922, %
Military officers	24,7	22,6	23,8	12,7	20,7	13,1
Administration	26,3	11,9	16,2	14,2	17,3	16,8
Landowners	11,4	15,5	8,0	8,5	8,3	3,6
Lawyers	26,3	25,0	18,1	29,5	20,2	23,6
Other professions	1,6	–	3,0	4,2	3,3	3,7
Academicians	1,6	13,1	17,0	19,7	17,3	19,6
Other intellectuals	4,9	7,1	7,9	7,0	7,5	14,0
Businessmen	1,6	4,8	5,0	4,2	4,7	5,6

<sup>16</sup> Counted out of an average number of governments over the analyzed period.

Social groups	1848–1861, %	1861–1876, %	1876–1900, %	1900–1913, %	1900–1913, %	1913–1922, %
Other	1,6	–	1,0	–	0,7	–
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0
<b>Among them, %:</b>						
Nobility	54,8	37,6	28,5	28,2	28,5	14,0
Technocrats	52,6	60,7	58,9	61,9	58,2	56,3

Źródło: Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Ministers in Italy: Notables, Party-men, Technocrats and Mediemen*, "South European Society and Politics" 2002, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 117–152.

However, a significant criterion of appointing ministers and other officials during this period was monarchy loyalty<sup>17</sup>. It should be kept in mind, that the monarchy due to many reasons (one of the mis its role in unification of the country) played an important part in forming the elements of power and state administration, and predominantly it was formed by the representatives of the upper class society and bureaucracy (especially in the military sector). The fact that a large part of ministers and state officials originated from this social environment suggested that they, in this period, obtained double loyalty – as to their parties/factions and electorate by means of the political process in the form of elections and towards the monarchy, as on the basis of their social and professional background there was “withdrawal” of nobility. Another large group of ministers and officials were representatives of the middle class, as about 40% of ministers and officials previously had free professions (mainly lawyers, engineers, doctors and architects) and represented different spheres of cultural life (journalists, university professors etc.). Thus, the first period of the representative politics in the history of Italy did not show the full break away at the level of executive power and state governance in comparison with the pre-representational period. High social origin, career in high ranks and levels of state administration, proximity to royal power were the elements, which characterized power-administration elite earlier and which did not disappear immediately when the institution of elections and representative bodies of authority were introduced. That is why the described peculiarities and elements of the public administration process were mainly “flowing” into a new representative policy both in parliament and in combination with it. However, even despite the fact that the reexisted the ways of introducing new elements of state administration, which were more obvious “products” of the electoral and parliamentary schemes, their importance in the course of time remained too restricted.

In its turn, formation of ministerial and administrative elite in the context of the developed parliamentary system (1876–1913) was characterized by such distinctive attributes and markers as: the end of domination of conservative political elite, which gave place to left forces in governmental cabinets and departments<sup>18</sup>; decline of republican ideals in herent to left parties for

<sup>17</sup> Farneti P., *Sistema politico e società civile*, Wyd. Giappichelli 1971.

<sup>18</sup> Cotta M., *Elite unification and democratic consolidation in Italy: an historic overview*, [w:] Higley J., Gunther R. (eds.), *Elite and Democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 146–177.

the benefit of more balanced monarchy; establishing of a new social-political division between traditional parties and radical left political forces; decrease of anaristocratic element in the system of administration in Italy in favor of academic specializations and intellectual positions; accelerated growth of the education level; predominance of prime-ministers, representatives of the middle class; formation of practice, concerning considering parliamentary experience (first of all in the electoral chamber of parliament) while appointing to the ministerial or administrative post; further growth of ministerial and bureaucratic stability; gradual increase of influence of the political process of representational type on establishing ministerial and administrative elite, while preserving the importance of aristocratic origin of the main part of the state administration<sup>19</sup> (see tables 1 and 2). In general, there occurred establishing of such system of administrative elite, for which important were both ministerial posts and roles, and experience in bureaucratic sector. Along with that the administrative system was formed on the basis of their complementation quality.

During the first period of mass representative suffrage in Italy, in particular before consolidation of fascism (1913–1924), there took place even more significant political and social transformations, which provoked a change in the meaning and characteristics of ministerial and administrative elite in general, for instance: introduction of more universal and equal (up to the quarter of adults) suffrage (1912) and its practical application (first in 1913)<sup>20</sup>; quick reformatting of the party system due to formation and consolidation of new political forces<sup>21</sup>, which were more frequently formed within the constructs of mass political parties and obtained majority (various parties in total) of seats in the parliament; formation of strong ideological and social-political divisions between parties; formation of representative democracy and bringing the issue of choice between the elites of an old “nobility” type and a new type of party functionaries to the agenda; formation of new practice of creating governmental cabinets and administrative hierarchy, as since then the prime-minister was obliged to get consent from parliamentary parties to appoint any minister; some reduction in indices of governmental and ministerial/administrative stability; inability of a mass-type parties to control governmental and administrative activity; continuation of the course towards reducing aristocracy and increasing the number of middle class and representatives of free professions (one third of ministers positioned themselves as “experts in ideas”) within the system of public administration; reducing experience and practice of the previous ministers’ and bureaucrats’ activity in the parliament. In general over the whole period from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> – early 20<sup>th</sup> century formation and functioning of administrative elite and system of governance in Italy was characterized by: significant

<sup>19</sup> Mastropaolo A., Sviluppo politico e parlamento nell'Italia liberale. Un'analisi a partire dai meccanismi della rappresentanza, “*Passato e Presente*” 1986, vol 12, s. 29–93; Rogari S., *Alle origini del Trasformismo*, Wyd. Laterza 1998; Fabri M., Governo e sovrano nell'Italia liberale, “*Rivista Trimestrale di Scienza dell'Amministrazione*” 1991, vol 3, s. 103–186.

<sup>20</sup> Ballini P., *Le elezioni nella storia d'Italia dall'Unità al Fascismo*, Wyd. Il Mulino 1989.

<sup>21</sup> Farneti P., *Social conflict, parliamentary fragmentation and, Institutional shift and the rise of fascism*, [w:] Linz J., Stepan A. (eds.), *The Breakdown of the Democratic regimes: Europe*, Wyd. The Johns Hopkins University Press 1978.



increase in size and quantitative representativeness of governmental cabinets and governance-administrative apparatus; change of social attributes of ministerial and administrative elite from representativeness of higher class of aristocracy to representativeness of the middle class of society; growth in the education level of ministers and state officials; growth of significance of representative experience of ministers and state officials in the electoral chamber of parliament<sup>22</sup>.

Fur their transformations in the governmental-administrative activity took place as a result of the transition of Italy to the stage of mass democracy after the collapse of fascism (1946-1992). These changes were determined by such qualitative attributes as: disappearance of liberal administrative-governmental elite (which was partially coopted in to the first fascist governmental cabinets) from political and administrative process; inclusion of mass parties to governmental and administrative political teams, which resulted in growth and consolidation of party governance and administrative logics<sup>23</sup>; restoration (after the fascism period) and strengthening of the parliamentary constitutional system and democracy, in which a governmental cabinet was interpreted as a responsible body before the parliament; restoration of some attribute of previous experience of democracies, in particular practice of obtaining positions in governmental cabinets and administrative staff on the basis of experience of parliamentary representativeness. It found its reflection in the fact that in Italy were formed variable constructions of party governments (including minority governments) and party governance, however, even within these frames quite influential remained technocratic components, which significantly modified a "long-term cycle" of Italian democracy<sup>24</sup>. They were supplemented by the point that the foundation of administrative strategies and governmental cabinets in Italy was formed by centrist parties and media policy. Therefore, the basic attributes of the system of governance and characteristic features of ministerial/administrative elite in Italy became: university education; middle adulthood; predominance of men (female suffrage was introduced only in 1946<sup>25</sup>); absence of education in military field (which was extremely widespread during the previous stages of establishing the systems of governance, and is contemporary represented only by technical cabinets)(in detail, see Table 3). Herewith, at first in the composition of administrative and governmental structures prevailed ministers and officials-politicians, who in everyday professional life were engaged into politics and later ministers and officials as representatives of specialized knowledge and technocrats. In general since 1946 in Italy has been applied practice of compulsory parliamentary support and origin of ministers and other representatives of the

<sup>22</sup> Cotta M., Mastropalo A., Verzichelli L., *Parliamentary Elite transformations along the Discontinuous Road of Democratization: Italy 1861–1999*, [w:] Best H., Cotta M. (eds.), *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 226–269.

<sup>23</sup> Clark M., *Modern Italy. 1871–1982*, Wyd. Longman 1984; Pasquino G., *Party government in Italy: achievement and prospects*, [w:] Katz R. (ed.), *Party government: European and American perspectives*, Wyd. de Gruyter 1987, s. 202–242.; Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Italy: the sunset of a partyocracy*, [w:] Blondel J., Cotta M. (eds.), *Party and government. An inquiry into the relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996, s. 180–201.

<sup>24</sup> Cotta M., *La crisi del governo di partito all'Italiana*, [w:] Cotta M., Isernia P. (eds.), *Il Gigante dai piedi di argilla*, Wyd. Il Mulino 1996, s. 36.

<sup>25</sup> Best H., Cotta M., *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

system of governance – either from the lower or upper chamber of the parliament (which from the Italian perspective have been evaluated as equivalent, because electoral and operational powers of the chambers are almost the same). In this was, for instance, over 90% of all ministers in governmental cabinets are elected. At the same time, the procedure of ministers' election in the parliament started including not only the moment of their support on the part of parliament, but also experience of occupying ministerial posts during the previous years of their work. It is notable that ministers usually passed three stages of their parliamentary activity to the post of the minister, which were connected with: 1) common parliamentary experience, which could be defined as a "test of personal level of adequacy for the ministerial post"; 2) experience of parliamentary leadership in some presidential team or legislative committee (which could be associated with the corresponding ministry); 3) socialization as to the executive structures without staying in them institutionally (which could be associated with gaining corresponding experience of ministerial activity)<sup>26</sup>.

**Table 3.** Social composition of governmental cabinets and top administrative staff in Italy (1946–2001)

Group	40s of the 20 <sup>th</sup> c., %	50s of the 20 <sup>th</sup> c., %	60s of the 20 <sup>th</sup> c., %	70s of the 20 <sup>th</sup> c., %	80s of the 20 <sup>th</sup> c., %	1992–1996, %	1996–2001, %	Total, %
Farmers	2,4	–	–	1,0	–	–	–	0,5
Business	12,2	6,9	6,1	9,3	6,4	6,3	3,2	6,6
Lawyers	36,6	43,1	34,1	22,7	14,7	12,5	7,6	22,6
Judges	–	–	1,2	1,0	2,8	6,3	9,3	2,9
Teachers	–	5,6	8,5	8,2	7,3	2,5	3,7	5,8
Professors	21,9	23,6	19,5	18,6	25,7	42,5	35,2	25,6
State service	–	–	–	4,1	7,3	5,0	9,3	5,2
Military men	–	–	1,2	–	–	1,3	–	0,5
Journalists	4,9	4,2	2,4	7,2	8,3	6,3	7,4	6,1
Engineers	7,3	1,4	3,7	1,0	1,8	–	–	1,8
Officials	–	–	–	–	2,8	2,5	1,9	1,3
Workers	–	2,8	3,7	2,1	–	3,8	–	1,1
Politicians	9,8	8,3	15,8	20,6	16,6	1,0	13,0	13,4
Economists	2,4	–	–	–	0,9	2,5	1,9	0,3
Other professions	–	1,4	3,7	3,1	4,6	7,5	1,9	4,5
Others	2,4	1,4	–	1,0	0,9	–	5,6	0,8

Źródło: Cotta M., Verzichelli L., Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen, "South European Society and Politics" 2002, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 117–152.

Correspondingly, delegation of ministerial and administrative powers to the leaders and members of governmental coalitions in Italy took place while taking in to account approximate

<sup>26</sup> Zuckerman A., *Italian Christian Democracy. The politics of factions*, Wyd. Sage 1979; Calise M., Mannheim R., *Governanti in Italia*, Wyd. Il Mulino 1982; Dogan M., *How to become ministers in Italy*, [w:] Dogan M. (ed.), *Pathways to power. Selecting rulers in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Westview 1989, s. 99–129; Marradi A., *Italy: From "centrism" to crisis of Centre-left coalition*, [w:] Browne E., Dreijmanis J. (eds.), *Government Coalitions in Western Democracies*, Wyd. Longman 1982, s. 33–70.

forces and levers of influence of coalitional parties and factions. Furthermore, the process of division of delegated ministerial and administrative posts took place at the party level<sup>27</sup>. At the same time, namely in the Italian case traditionally appeared some administrative-governmental problems, as political class, represented by governmental political parties, is a product of the process of representativeness, in which electoral (local and national) positions and party career ladder were strictly overlapping, thus normalization of administrative positions is not accidental, but follows a certain career path, which is different for different parties<sup>28</sup>. For instance, in case of the Christian democrats there is a traditionally strong network of ties with trade-unions, employers' organizations and other groups of interests. Herewith, groups of interest concerning ministerial and administrative positions in Italy, as M. Cotta and I. Verzichelli state<sup>29</sup>, are extremely strong, as more than 40% of ministers and administrative officials are appointed as a result of contacts with such groups of interest. It was rather noticeable over the period of 40s-60s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the "interrelation" between ministers/officials and groups of interest was the most significant. Only since the 70s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century there started the process of deliberate distancing of ministers and administrative officials from such structures. However, the process was moving (and this is still can be traced) towards the overall control of political parties over ministerial and other administrative assignments. In general, the system of party governmental cabinets in Italy obtained the elements of party control both from the inside and outside<sup>30</sup>. One may speak of inside control, because a great part of ministerial and administrative officials started being arranged by "party members-generalists", who got used to represent their parties in governmental cabinets<sup>31</sup>. Outside control appears because the level of ministers' and administrative officials' autonomy to some extent was restricted by powers of party leaders, who stay outside governmental cabinets and give preference to those officials who belong to parties. In general, there are all grounds to describe specific nature of governmental cabinets in Italy as unstable and controversial from the perspective of governmental coalitions and inter-party factions. In this regard, as it was mentioned above and as W. Bakema<sup>32</sup> argues, ministerial and administrative duration in Italy is lower, than duration of analogous ministers in other western European countries. Herewith, the heyday of the system of governmental, ministerial and administrative elite was the period of the 60s-70s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when in Italy started

<sup>27</sup> Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Italy: the sunset of a partyocracy*, [w:] Blondel J., Cotta M. (eds.), *Party and government. An inquiry into the relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996, s. 180–201.; Verzichelli L., La distribuzione delle spoglie ministeriali. Proposte per l'analisi comparata, con una indagine sul caso italiano, "Quaderni di scienza politica" 2001, vol 8, s. 51–98.; Mershon C., Party Factions and Coalition Government. Portfolio allocation in Italian Christian Democracy, "Electoral Studies" 2001, vol 20, s. 554–580.

<sup>28</sup> Cotta M., *Classe politica e parlamento in Italia*, Wyd. Il Mulino 1979.

<sup>29</sup> Cotta M., Verzichelli L., Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen, "South European Society and Politics" 2002, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 117–152.

<sup>30</sup> Cotta M., Verzichelli L., *Italy: the sunset of a partyocracy*, [w:] Blondel J., Cotta M. (eds.), *Party and government. An inquiry into the relationship between governments and supporting parties in liberal democracies*, Wyd. Macmillan 1996, s. 180–201.

<sup>31</sup> Blondel J., *The Ministers of Finance: a special type of Minister?*, European University Institute Working papers 1991: Series SPS, nr. 31.

<sup>32</sup> Bakema W., *The Ministerial Career*, [w:] Blondel J., Thiebault J. (eds.), *The profession of government minister in Western Europe*, Wyd. Macmillan 1991, s. 70–98.

the era of centrismo and centro-sinistra (centrism and right-centrism), as namely at that time stability of parliamentary-governmental and administrative elites reached its maximum level.

In this context quite relevant is an appeal towards the declared phenomenon of party members-generalist and administrative officials-specialists. If the marker of party members-generalists is to depend on frequent transition from one post to another, as J. Blondel<sup>33</sup> states, then it becomes clear that during the period of “the first republic” in Italy (till 1992) a large number of ministers were included into research at least once, and the third part of them changed not less than three different positions in the governmental cabinet. Such result is in line with a partological model of the career ladder for ministers and state officials and is explained by the intention to preserve continuous balance within the frames of factional and regional representation, as well as balance of powers between party leaders and government/administrative elite on the basis of rapid circulation of ministerial/administrative elites from the “first circle” of less significant ministerial/administrative positions to the internal circle of top-ministers and officials. All this resulted in the following: increase in frequency of changes among ministers and administrative officials; transformation of political parties aimed at their factionalization; decrease in number of ministers and administrative officials from the sphere of bureaucratic-party structures; growth in number of ministers and administrative officials without party affiliation (technocrats) and experience in representation at the level of power structures and governmental bodies. It generates the conclusion concerning the so-called corporate nature of a governmental system and system of public administration in Italy. Herewith, the corporate model of governance in Italy is supplemented by the fact that in the 80s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century within the structure of ministers and administrative officials appeared and became more common technocrats or semi-technocrats. At the same time, they concern several crucial spheres of governance – state administration and finances. For example, professor S. Giannini – minister of state administration, professor A. LaPergola – minister of European affairs, former head of the Central Bank G. Carli – minister of finances. In the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century ministry of finances was traditionally in hands of technocrats – professors Barucci, C. Campi, L. Dini. As a result the rules of coalition bargain has been changed, as the reappeared the necessity “to do some thing unpleasant” in certain spheres of governmental and administrative policy, not to burden parties with difficult responsibilities<sup>34</sup>. The highest point was formation of several non-party/technocratic governments and systems of governance in Italy under the charge of the prime-ministers L. Dini and M. Monti in the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In this context it is determined that Italy, at least since the 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has been characterized by a significant transformation of social structure of administrative elite. The point is that many ministers and state administrative officials in the country are not just

<sup>33</sup> Blondel J., *Ministers in Southern Europe. A comparative perspective*, Paper presented at the Seminario de Arrabida, 17–18 September 2001.

<sup>34</sup> Verzichelli L., La distribuzione delle spoglie ministeriali. Proposte per l'analisi comparata, con una indagine sul caso italiano, *Quaderni di scienza politica* 2001, vol 8, s. 51–98.; Müller W., Strom K., *Coalition governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

politicians and leaders of their political parties (that are theoretically run for the positions in government on the grounds of parliamentary elections), but also on on-party and of ten non-political functionaries or experts-politicians with specific peculiarities of delegating their powers and specific functional skills of governance (as they are conventionally enlisted to deal with particular issues of policy and state administration). In this way occurs significant distancing of cause-and-effect relationship in the system of governance from a conventional delegation and liability before and on behalf of legislature. And this, in its turn explains technocratic style of governance as a partial alternative for party governance conventional in Italy. However, synthesis of party and technocratic components of public governance in Italy is rather an instrument for providing and advancing possible answers to those difficult questions which appear on the political agenda. This has several explanations: a) complicated and “high-technological” character of democratic administration; b) organizational and reputational risks of political parties and, as a result, involvement of experts-technocrats, enlisted from the “civil society”, with the aim to avoid votes of non-confidence in governments; c) concentration of power in hands of several people, who represent “main executives” in the system of governance and in the process of “presidential/premier governmental cabinets”<sup>35</sup> and, therefore, allow the latter to assign personal but not political agents to the posts in the sphere of public administration; d) influence of supranational arenas and institutions on the structure of national political institutions in Italy and as a result, the necessity of more effective fight against restrictions, which come from supranational structures<sup>36</sup>. Within the frames of delegating powers and responsibilities<sup>37</sup> it strictly determines that, on the one hand, technocratic governance is an infringement of principal-agent relations, inherent to the parliamentary democracy and republic in Italy, but, on the other hand, it testifies that technocratic elite and ways of delegating its powers are connected with the specific aims of power-administrative process<sup>38</sup>. It is revealed in the fact that a political ministers and state officials may be subject to responsibility for implementation of priorities, which were earlier determined in governmental-political and administrative platform, or may act as a kind of “protectors” for implementation of a set of reforms or, eventually, as “inspirational factors” for such reforms in this or that sphere of policy and governance.

Along with that, it is quite evident that the increase in number of ministers and officials-technocrats and technocratic element of the system of governance in Italy in general is presupposed by a significant complication of channels of being involved and promoted within

<sup>35</sup> Poguntke T., Webb P., *The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2005.

<sup>36</sup> Johansson K. M., Tallberg J., Explaining Chief Executive Empowerment: EU Summitry and Domestic Institutional Change. “*West European Politics*” 2010, vol 33, nr. 2, s. 208–233; Cotta M., Verzichelli L., Ministers in Italy: Notables, Partymen, Technocrats and Mediamen, “*South European Society and Politics*” 2002, vol 7, nr. 2, s. 117–152; Verzichelli L., *Portfolio allocation*, [w:] Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2008, s. 237–268.; Verzichelli L., *Italy. The difficult road towards a more effective process of ministerial selection*, [w:] Dowding K., Dumont P. (eds.), *The selection of ministers in Europe. Hiring and firing*, Wyd. Routledge 2009, s. 89–100.

<sup>37</sup> Strom K., Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2003, vol 37, nr. 3, s. 261–279.

<sup>38</sup> Downing K., Dumont P., *Structural and strategic factors affecting the hiring and firing of ministers*, [w:] Dowding K., Dumont P. (eds.), *The selection of ministers in Europe. Hiring and firing*, Wyd. Routledge 2009, s. 1–20.

the frames of administrative elite. It is supplemented by the fact that it is traditional for Italy, at least after the WWII, to be characterized by considerable polarization of interparty competitiveness<sup>39</sup>. Thus, especially in the context of politically and party determined style of governance, technocrats in the system of state administration in Italy are positioned and oscillate, on the one hand, between their expert neutrality and potential for cooptation with parties, but, on the other hand, a chance to be transformed into party-political functionaries. It is especially correct from the point of view of ministers' and administrators' promotion in Italy, as being specialists in various spheres of economy; they can position themselves both as independent experts, and party-oriented experts<sup>40</sup>. In this way, takes place involvement of experts in to the processes of state administration In case of their segmental or simultaneous positioning either as politicians or as technocrats.

To sum up, we can say that: a) it has been traditionally characteristic and nowadays even more common for Italy to involve in to the administrative sector ministers and administrators-technocrats, but immanently in herent and preferential was and is politically (party and parliamentary) determined nature of state administration; b) ministers and administrators-technocrats being characterized by higher level of autonomy and practical-professional experience, are more intelligent and efficient, than ministers and administrators-politicians, and in this way they influence the total raise of governmental quality in Italy; c) ministers and administrators-technocrats partially defect the relations of delegation of powers and responsibilities, which are in herent to the parliamentary democracy in Italy, however, do not annul them completely, as they remain in minority in comparison with ministers and administrators-politicians; d) technocratic component of state administration in Italy significantly overcomes ideological polarization of interparty competitiveness and party element of governance and thus stabilize and promote efficiency of the latter; e) synthesis of political and technocratic components of state administration do not always undermine democratic nature of the latter, and, on the one hand, denotes the nature of delegation of powers and responsibility by administrators, but, on the other, generates a bit different from classical, which is aimed at searching consensus in the context of political polarization, model of parliamentary democracy.

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<sup>39</sup> Marangoni F., Verzichelli L., *Italy: from personalized polarization to technocratic co-operation?*, Presented at 2012 SISP Congress, Roma, 13–14 September 2012, 30 s.

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